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Abstract
Real-world policymakers want to extract investors' private information about a policy's likely eects
by \listening to" asset markets. However, this brings the risk that investors will protably \ma-
nipulate" prices to steer policy. We model the interaction between a policymaker and an informed
(prot-seeking) investor who can buy/short-sell an asset from uninformed traders. We character-
ize when the investor's incentives do not align with the policymaker's, implying that to induce
truth-telling behavior the policymaker must commit to sometimes ignoring the signal (as revealed
by the investor's behavior driving the asset's price). This implies a commitment to executing the
policy with a probability depending on the asset's price. We develop a taxonomy for the full set
of relationships between private signals, asset values, and policymaker welfare, characterizing the
optimal indirect mechanism for each case. We nd that where the policymaker is ex-ante indier-
ent, she commits to sometimes/never executing after a bad signal, but always executes after a good
signal. Generically, this \listening" mechanism leads to higher (policymaker) welfare then ignoring
the signals. We discuss real-world evidence, implications for legislative processes, and phenomena
such as \trial balloons" and \committing political capital".
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1 Introduction
There are realms where we expect key informed private individuals to know more than policymakers
about the impacts of a potential policy. If assets are publicly traded and markets are ecient
aggregators of information we might expect policymakers to use these to determine the best policies.
For example, we might consider a trade agreement, new copyright law, or education policy, as
aiming to increase the productivity or long run prots of some sector. We can also consider policies
designed to increase consumer surplus or government revenue by reducing rents in some industry,
e.g, health-care reform and the insurance, drug, and hospital industries. In either case, key private
players and managers in these sectors may have considerable private information about the likely
eect of each policy.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose that at a precise point in time a specic new policy
is formulated, or becomes relevant, that was not previously considered. Assume that it is common
knowledge that the policymaker (henceforth \the PM") will execute the policy if the asset's price
goes in the \right" direction tomorrow. Suppose the policy is designed to boost prots, but the
PM is not sure if it will do so. We say that the policy is \good" when it will increase the PM's
welfare, and we say it is \bad" otherwise.1 If investors receive a signal that the policy is good they
may buy the asset, causing its traded price to increase, convincing the PM to execute the policy.
On the other hand, if the signal suggests that the policy is bad they might not buy the asset (or
may short sell it), the asset's price will not increase, and the PM will not execute the policy. Here,
for either signal, the movement in the asset price is justied by the ultimate policy choice.
This may also work when the good policy reduces the assets' value.2 For example, a policy
may be intended to reduce excess insurance company prot, but its true eect may not be known.3
1Obviously, the PM's incentives may or may not be aligned with the public interest; this central issue of public
choice is out of the scope of this paper.
2Our model does not require that the policy's goal directly involves its eect on an industry or an asset's value;
we simply consider particular alignments, as discussed below. An exogenous factor, e.g., the progress of technology
or the potential supply of some natural resource, may happen to determine both whether a policy will be successful
for the PM and whether a particular asset is protable.
3For example, the USA's 2010 Aordable Care Act included an individual mandate and subsidies to purchase
insurance as well as the establishment of \insurance exchanges" with regulations intended to reduce prices through
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Here, the PM announces a policy. If the price of insurance company shares declines the next day
she will execute the policy, and the market's reaction is justied. If the price does not decrease the
PM will not execute the policy and again the market's (non-) reaction is justied.
However, unlike in the above scenarios, the interests of the PM and the asset holder may not
align. For example, although the PM wants the policy to be executed if and only if it is good, the
asset holder may always want the policy to be executed, or he may never want it to be executed.4
Thus an asset holder might seek to hide his signal from the PM and thus \manipulate" the asset
price. However, the party with inside information need not be the asset holder, and even asset
holders may be able sell o their holdings. In our preferred model, we consider the decisions of an
Informed Investor (henceforth II) who interacts with an individual Uninformed Trader (henceforth
\UT"), or equivalently, a number of uninformed traders.5
Nonetheless, even where incentives are not naturally aligned, the PM may still be able to extract
information from II if she can make a binding commitment to execute (or to not execute) the policy
with some minimum probability regardless of II's actions.6 Both types of commitment change II's
incentives through two channels. First, they can reduce (or increase) the eect of the II's action
on the probability the policy is executed, hence reducing or increasing the asset's relative expected
encouraging competition and transparent pricing. It was widely assumed the mandate would have a side eect of
boosting insurance company prots, while the exchanges and regulations were meant to counter this. Presumably
policymakers hoped in net to reduce (or at least not increase) insurance company prots, but opponents of the bill
argued that would be a \giveaway" to the insurance industry.
4For example, a solar energy rm may want a massive public subsidy for research and development, as it will
almost certainly be protable for this rm. However, the PM may only nd it worthwhile if it leads to dramatic
breakthroughs, which would lead both to extremely large prots for the rm and large social benets.
5If your eyes see II as the Roman numeral \two" you can think of him as a \type II" investor, in comparison to
the \type I" uninformed trader \UT". We will occasionally refer to him as just \II" without the article \the" when
it sounds better. with no \inherent" interest in the assets' value, who may buy the asset, short sell it, or do nothing.
With an endogenous asset price, the relevant \alignment" of incentives is subtle; the II's incentives will depend on
the relative probabilities of each signal as well as the eects of policy on asset values.
6In the example just mentioned, the PM might tie her own hands to sometimes execute the R&D subsidy even if,
after announcing the policy being considered, the solar energy rm's share price do not increase dramatically. She
may also (or instead) commit to sometimes not executing it even if the share price does not increase dramatically
after the announcement.
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value after each action. Second, if these probabilistic commitments are common knowledge, they
will also aect the ex-ante expected returns to the asset, and hence increase or decrease the price
the II must pay the UTs for the asset. If the II can short sell the asset, these eects on the initial
asset price will have a double eect on the relative returns to buying versus short-selling.
Note that we model the II as a single informed investor, or, equivalently, a set of informed
investors who coordinate and can thus drive the market. We do not focus on the case where
information is diusely held.7
The mechanisms we propose are indirect ones: the PM does not directly pay the II as a
function of his revealed signal and the outcome. Instead, she uses existing asset markets as a tool,
and the eciency of the mechanism depends on the structure and parameters of the environment.
We justify this in the conclusion.
We solve for the entire parameter space of incentive alignments, dividing these up into six
intuitive cases, oering an intuitive taxonomy, and motivating these with real world examples.
Given ex-ante policy indierence we nd that inducing truth-telling behavior and listening to
markets is generically strictly preferable for the PM. We nd an interesting asymmetry: where
the PM is ex-ante indierent, and where her commitment is common knowledge, she commits to
occasionally (or never) executing after a bad signal, but she always executes after a good signal.
Also surprising: allowing the II to short-sell { giving him a greater set of options { may make
implementation harder or easier and thus decrease or increase the PM's payo, depending on
parameters.
Our work is largely a theoretical benchmark; we consider the case with the maximum potential
for manipulation, where II is a single agent, and describe how the optimal mechanism involves
randomization, and dene the frontier of what the PM can achieve. Our paper may also be seen
as a normative policy proposal. However, these considerations may also be reected in current
practices, and decision-makers are already taking prediction markets into account (Arrow et al.,
7In such a case the informed investors might fail to coordinate on the more ecient equilibrium. Even after a
signal that the policy is both good and protable, these investors might refrain from buying the asset, each believing
that none of the others will buy, and thus the signal will not be passed to the PM, and the policy may not be executed.
We return to this discussion in the conclusion.
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2008). Although PMs make policy announcements and oat \trial balloons" there is little evidence
that they explicitly commit to tying policy to asset prices. Still there is anecdotal evidence of some
policymaker \market-watching." Legislative processes, policy trials, and \committing political
capital" may also enable listening and informal conditional commitments, in essence a purication
of the mixed/behavioral strategy. We expand on this in the conclusion.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. We specify our formal model
in section 3. In section 4 we give general lemmas and results. We conclude in section 5, focusing
on the broader academic and practical policy implications of s, ways in which the model could be
extended, and suggestions for empirical work.
2 Literature Review
Previous work has analyzed the relationship between the values of assets in conventional markets
and the policy predictions of information markets.8 These papers have also considered the impli-
cations of using such analysis to set policy. A more extensive literature has considered the eect of
policy announcements on asset prices, and the implications that can be drawn from these through
event studies. A major concern is that if future policy itself reacts to the market's response to
the policy announcement, the market response may be hard to interpret; this has been called the
\circularity problem" (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997; Sumner and Jackson, 2008).
To circumvent this circularity, others have proposed the use of \conditional prediction mar-
kets"(Hanson, 2013; Abramowicz, 2004). In such a market one asset takes a value, tied to some
outcome, if a policy is executed, another asset takes a value if it is not executed, and otherwise
trades are canceled. For example, Hahn and Tetlock (2003) consider assets whose values are tied
to the level of GDP in the event (or non-event, for the second asset) of a carbon emissions cap, and
consider what the dierence in these asset prices reveal about the likely eect of such a cap.
However, according to Hahn and Tetlock (2003), \[a] general concern is that information markets
8Information markets are markets which do not represent direct claims on tangible assets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz,
2006). Our analysis may also apply to corporate policy, in cases where the corporate management may know less
about outcomes than the market as a whole. Kau et al. (2008) nd that, \on average, managers listen to the market:
they are more likely to cancel investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement."
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are susceptible to price manipulation by those with a vested interest in the policy decision"; the
other aforementioned authors express similar concerns. Because of this, there are important limits
to the use of prediction markets, which tend to be thin and illiquid.9 When real assets such as
rms and physical capital are strongly aected by a policy it may be dicult to make prediction
markets large enough to deter manipulation. Furthermore, if the main impact of a policy is only
known by a single individual or a coordinated group with the ability to heavily invest or short sell
(or with a strong direct interest in the outcome) then bringing large numbers of other uninformed
traders into the prediction market will not deter manipulation.
It may be more eective for policymakers to learn from the movement of real large-scale asset
markets and from real investment decisions when a policy is announced, explicitly recognizing
(and perhaps publicizing) the connection between the probability of executing the policy and the
movement in the asset prices. In this context policymakers could explicitly take into account the
incentive for manipulation and use randomized execution to induce truth-telling. As we discuss
below, the potential to deter \market manipulation" may rely on the ability of a policymaker
to make binding commitments to a random policy execution mechanism. Our paper explicitly
formalizes and models this problem.
A few recent papers consider the potential for market manipulation in related contexts. Hanson
and Oprea (2009) has some similarities to ours, but is fundamentally dierent in its aims and
assumptions. These authors model a market microstructure with noise traders, potentially informed
traders, a competitive market maker, and a thin prediction market. As in our model they have a
single rational \manipulator"; however, in contrast to us they assume he has a specic preference
over the market price or over \the beliefs of neutral observers inuenced by the price." In other
words, their manipulator is essentially a \noise trader" who has a specic goal unrelated to the
asset's true value. In contrast, our II seeks only to make a prot o of the policy outcome he
induces.10
9Sumner and Jackson (2008) note that conditional and prediction markets are likely to be thin and hence unreliable,
arguing government subsidies to trading are needed to combat this.
10Our model diers in other important ways. Our II has unique private information; they assume a large number
of traders who can pay a cost to learn about the asset's true value and about the manipulator's preferred price.
Another dierence: we explicitly model the policy choice.
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2.1 Empirical work and examples
There are several recent cases in which policymakers seem to have listened to the market, or where
others have suggested that they could or should have done so.
Breinlich (2011) examined stock market reactions to the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA). He found that \increases in the likelihood of ratication led to stock market
gains of exporting rms relative to non-exporters", and used this to impute increased \expected
per-period prots of exporters by around 6-7% relative to non-exporters."
During the debate over the US Aordable Care Act, Milani (2010) tracked the stock returns
of health insurance companies against a prediction market security whose payo was tied to the
inclusion of the \public option" in the bill. He concluded, \the results reveal the market expectation
of a negative eect of the public option on the value of health insurance companies." Friedman
(2009) performed event studies on pharmaceutical rms' share prices as they introduced new drugs,
comparing the implied protability of (low versus high Medicare share) drugs before and after the
introduction of the Medicare Part D prescription drug benet. He used this to impute that the bill
would lead to $205 billion in additional drug company prots.
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) presented evidence, in the context of the Iraq war in the 2000's,
that spot and futures market oil (and equity index option) prices moved in line with a prediction
market for a security that paid o if Saddam Hussein were removed from power by a certain date.11
They used this to estimate the distribution of investors' beliefs for the impact of the war on the
economy, imputing \a substantial probability of an extremely adverse outcome."
As Wolfers and Zitzewitz (ibid) argue, the above sort of evidence be used to \better understand
the consequences of a prospective policy decision ... [and] to inform decision-making in real time."
In light of the above evidence, the public option might have been scrapped, the drug benet
repealed or reformed, the Iraq war reconsidered, and the CAFTA agreement reinforced or cancelled
(depending on whether PMs thought the gains were large enough).
The Pentagon also attempted to use markets to predict geopolitical risks. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency proposed introducing a policy market that in the Summer of 2003; some
11They interpret this as reecting the probability of a US attack on Iraq in 2002-2003.
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claimed these involved \terrorism futures". However, the project was cancelled, allegedly in light
of concerns that bad actors might themselves invest, commit terrorist acts, and prot from this
(Hanson, 2005).12
Poland's 2011-2012 experience seems to be a particularly clear-cut example of policy responding
to the market's reaction. In November 2011, Polish PM Donald Tusk announced a new tax on
copper and silver. Share prices of KGHM (which controls all of Poland's copper production) fell by
14% on the day of the announcement and a further 9.7% in the next session. On January 3, 2012
the Finance Ministry lowered this proposed tax rate after negative reactions from the Economy
and Treasury ministries and from the company, which argued the tax would make output at one of
its three mines inviable. Economy Minister Waldemar Pawlak explicitly mentioned the share price
reaction in his criticism.13
3 Model
In this section, we describe the primitives of our model, the economy in which investors and
policymakers interact, and we discuss our maintained assumptions. We next introduce the asset
market and justify the assumptions of our model; in particular (i) the timing of information, and
in our preferred specication (ii) an endogenous initial asset value and (iii) allowing short-selling.
We give a general characterization of the II's and PM's optimization problems and incentive
compatibility constraints, and present some general results and lemmas.
We give some notation. The state is denoted by s 2 S. There is an informed investor \II", who
receives a binary signal,  2 f; g, in which  is the good signal and  is the bad signal. The signal
is correlated with the state of the world s 2 fG;Bg, i.e., the good state and the bad state (these
12This would be a distinct form of manipulation from our discussion; such concerns involve physical actions taken
in order to manipulate markets; we are considering nancial transactions and investments made in order to inuence
policy (which in turn inuences asset values). We assume that the PM does not derive welfare from the investments;
if these \investments" are acts of terrorism this is obviously the PM's concern.
13Pawlak: \If the tax had been more clearly presented during the prime minister's expose, there would be less
unrest and less uctuation in KGHM's share value. Now we have to prepare [the new tax] properly so that it benets
the state but doesn't kill KGHM" (http://www.wbj.pl/article-57461-deputy-pm-criticizes-copper-tax.html, accessed
on 1 Jan. 2014)
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states reect the welfare consequences of a policy, as formalized below). P (s; ) represents the joint
probability over (s; ), and P (sj) is the conditional probability of s given . The unconditional
probabilities are P (s) :=
P
2f;g P (s; ) and P () :=
P
s2fG;Bg P (s; ).
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3.1 Timing and policymaker's objective function
Timing:
1. Nature chooses the state of the world, s 2 fG;Bg.
2. The PM commits to probabilities of execution q(^) 2 (0; 1) as a function of the signal to be
revealed ^ 2 f; g. These commitments are publicly observed or deduced by all parties.
3. [t = 0] The initial asset price A0 is formed by the expectation of one or more Uninformed
Traders (henceforth, UTs). They are willing to sell or \commit to buy" a total of one unit at
this price.
4. The II receives signal  and chooses i 2 fb; nb; shg; respectively, buying one unit, doing
nothing, or short selling one unit. The II's action becomes observable to the PM (through
its impact on the asset price), sending a signal ^ to the PM.
5. The PM executes the policy with the pre-committed probability q(^), where ^ =  in a truth
telling equilibrium.
6. [t = 1]. Payos are realized.
We consider this to be a useful representation of the real world. Suppose we had alternately
assumed that the II got the signal before t = 0, and all agents could anticipate the policy that
would be considered at time t = 1, A0 would incorporate the II's signal. In such a case it would
be unclear when the PM should look for a discrete jump in the asset price reecting the policy
announcement. Our preferred interpretation of the timing is the following. Although the policy is
14Although we restrict the set of states and the set of signals to be two elements, we could easily extend the current
setup into many states and many possible signals.
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not a complete surprise, (e.g., it might have long been known that the government would pursue a
prescription drug plan in 2007), the policy is multi-dimensional, nuanced, and detailed. There is a
random element to the PM's choice of policy details; the \listening" pertains to the eect of this.
The PM chooses from a potentially innite set with commonly known statistical properties.15 The
chosen policy will be \good" with probability P (), etc., as described above. Only after the II
knows the chosen policy, he can use his inside information to learn about the policy's likely eects.
We denote this as \II receives signal ."
PM's payo: The PM either executes a policy (denoted p = e) or does not (denoted p = ne). The
PM's payo with the policy choice p and the state s is W (p; s). Note that the investment decision
i is not in the PM's objective function. We assume that the PM wants to execute the policy if and
only if the true signal is ; i.e.,  represents the \good news" about the policy. Formally,
Assumption 1 (i)
P
s P (sj)W (e; s) >
P
s P (sj)W (ne; s), (ii)
P
s P (sj)W (e; s) <
P
s P (sj)W (ne; s).
With probabilistic execution of the policy hq(); q()i, (implicitly assuming the PM has deduced
the true signals) the PM's expected payo is:

(q(); q()) :=
X
s;
P (s; )
h
q()W (e; s) + (1  q())W (ne; s)
i
:
For later use, we re-write the PM's payo in terms of gains/losses from execution in either state:X
s;
P (; s)W (ne; s) + q()P ()(EW (ej)  EW (nej)) + q()P ()(EW (ej)  EW (nej))
=
X
s;
P (; s)W (ne; s) + q()P ()W ()| {z }
(+)
+q()P ()W ()| {z }
( )
(1)
where we dene EW (pj) :=Ps P (sj)W (p; s) and W () := EW (ej)  EW (nej).
By Assumption 1 the second term is positive, and the third term is negative. Thus, as long as
the incentive compatibility constraints (described in section 3.3) are satised so that the II reveals
the true signal, the PM wants to maximize q() and minimize q().
As a benchmark, we assume that before learning the signal the PM is indierent between
executing the policy and not executing it.
15The idea that the specic policy could not have been predicted may be justied as in models of incomplete
information.
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Assumption 2 The policymaker is ex-ante indierent between policies < q() = 1; q() = 1 >
and < q() = 0; q() = 0 >, i.e.,16
X
s
P (s)W (e; s) =
X
s
P (s)W (ne; s) i.e., W ()P () + W ()P () = 0:
This indierence assumption implies that changes to q() and q() have equal and opposite
direct eects on PM's welfare (holding the II's behavior constant).
3.2 Asset market and the informed investor's payo
The asset's fundamental value, A1(p; s), represents the discounted stream of future earnings from
the asset; this will depend on the state and the policy. At the end of the interaction, at time t = 1,
after the state and the policy decision become common knowledge, the asset's price will equal its
fundamental value.17
Determination of A0: We could have alternately assumed that the initial asset price A0 is exoge-
nous, i.e., not aected by q() and q(). Instead, we assume it is based on the expected outcomes
in light of the conditional probabilities of execution and the unconditional probabilities of each
signal. We argue that the latter assumption is more reasonable and relevant.18 Suppose A0 were
exogenous, and the parameters were such that (e.g.) holding the asset is protable on average
given the announced values of hq(); q()i. If one takes an arbitrary value of A0, the UTs could be
systematically \fooled" and make negative prots in expectation. To avoid this contradiction of ra-
tional expectations, we assume that conditional probabilities are correctly anticipated. (The results
would be equivalent if we alternatively allowed these probabilities to not be correctly anticipated
but assumed they are publicly announced before A0 is set.)
16The equivalence of the two conditions is derived by the following.
W ()P () + W ()P () = 0, P ()(EW (ej)  EW (nej)) + P ()(EW (ej)  EW (nej)) = 0
,P ()EW (ej) + P ()EW (ej) = P ()EW (nej) + P ()EW (ej),
X
s
P (s)W (e; s) =
X
s
P (s)W (ne; s)
17We assume that no earnings accrue from the asset until after time t = 1; this is without loss of generality.
18The results of the model with exogenous A0 are available by request.
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Other possible justications for an exogenous A0 do not seem reasonable or relevant to our
empirical examples.19 Thus we assume that at time t = 0 the asset's initial price A0 is determined
by the expectations of the UTs before they potentially learn the signal , allowing them to depend
on the PM's probabilistic commitments. I.e., A0 := A0(q(); q()).
We further assume that the signal and the state are specic to the policy, i.e., if the policy is
not executed the asset's value does not depend on the state:
Assumption 3
A1(ne) := A1(p = ne; s = G) = A1(p = ne; s = B):
Thus, the expectation of A1(ne) is invariant to the signal (and state), i.e., EA1(nej) = A1(ne) for
any  2 f; g.
Using this, we derive the initial asset price:
A0(q(); q()) =P ()q()
X
s
P (sj)A1(e; s) + P ()q()
X
s
P (sj)A1(e; s)
+ [P ()(1  q()) + P ()(1  q())]A1(ne)
=P ()q()[EA1(ej) A1(ne)] + P ()q()[EA1(ej) A1(ne)] +A1(ne)
=q()P ()A1() + q()P ()A1() +A1(ne); (2)
where we dene EA1(ej) { the expected value of the asset conditional on execution and signal,
and A1() { the expected benet of execution (relative to non-execution) to an asset-holder given
signal , as
EA1(ej) :=
X
s
P (sj)A1(p = e; s); and A1() := EA1(ej) A1(ne):
19Two possible justications: (i) If only the II could prot from holding the asset at t = 1 (e.g., through his own
production process) and he holds all the bargaining power, then A0 would be priced at cost, regardless of the q's.
However, this would imply that the PM could only identify the signal if she could identify who the II was in advance
and identify his precise choice, a dicult proposition. (ii) If the policy was considered a zero-probability event, and
the policy as well as the q functions were announced to the II's before being publicly announced, or the II's could
react to this information before the UTs, then A0 might also be unaected by the q's; it also seems unlikely that the
PM could orchestrate this. Furthermore, neither of these scenarios seem to reect the empirical cases we describe.
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Note that the price A0 does not depend on the signal, as the signal is not common knowledge
at t = 0.
II's payos: II's payo is his net return from buying or short selling the asset. We assume that
he can buy the rst unit at price A0 before his action is detected, and the price rises to A1. (Even
if we change the size of this rst unit, our results will not change.) If he chooses to buy at time
t = 0, setting i = b, he pays A0 to the UT, and earns the asset's fundamental value A1 at t = 1.
Thus, for either policy choice p 2 fe; neg and for either signal s 2 fG;Bg,
V (p; s; i = b) = A1(p; s) A0:
If he short sells at time t = 0 (i.e., setting i = sh), he gets paid A0 by the UT, and then must
buy the asset at its fundamental value at t = 1. Thus, holding the policy constant, the payo from
short selling is the negative of the payo from buying, i.e.,
V (p; s; i = sh) = A0  A1(p; s) =  V (p; s; i = b):
If the II does nothing at time t = 0 (i.e., setting i = nb), he neither pays nor receives anything
at t = 0 and neither owns nor owes the asset at time t = 1; thus
V (p; s; i = nb) = 0:
As we show in Appendix A.5, either buying or short selling will yield non-negative prots for
II. Thus he will never strictly prefer to \do nothing", if short selling is allowed (note that we
assume no administrative costs to transactions). He will be indierent only for a knife edge case.20
We next dene II's expected payo from buying when he receives signal  and takes the action
that leads the PM to believe the signal was ^ (henceforth, we will say \his action reports ^"; note
that ^ =  in a truth-telling mechanism):
EV (i = bj; ^) =
X
s
P (sj)[q(^)V (e; s; b) + (1  q(^))V (ne; s; b)]
= q(^)[EV (ej)  EV (ne)] + EV (ne) = q(^)[EA1(ej)  EA1(ne)] + EA1(ne) A0(q(); q())
= q(^)A1() +A1(ne) A0(q(); q()): (3)
20In policy considerations one might want to consider investors who own an asset that is aected by the policy but
which they can not sell without large administrative costs. We save this for future work.
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In other words, when the II's signal is  and his action reports ^, his expected payo from
buying is q(^)A1(), the expected increase in asset value given the true and reported signals, plus
the baseline value under non-execution A1(ne), less the cost of buying the share A0(q(); q()).
When the II's signal is  and the PM believes it was ^, the II's prot from short selling is
EV (i = shj; ^) =  q(^)A1() A1(ne) +A0(q(); q()) =  EV (i = bj; ^): (4)
Expanding A0(q(); q()), equations 3 and 4 become:
EV (i = bj; ^) = q(^)A1()  [q()P ()A1() + q()P ()A1()]; (5)
EV (i = shj; ^) =  EV (i = bj; ^) =  q(^)A1() + q()P ()A1() + q()P ()A1(): (6)
The rst term on the right hand side of (5) and (6) is the expected gain or loss in asset value
from probabilistic execution given the true and reported signals. The bracketed terms are the ex-
ante expectation of this gain or loss, i.e., A0   A1(ne). Holding constant the signal sent, the gain
from shorting is the loss from buying and vice-versa. With a truth-telling mechanism, buying and
short selling will send opposite signals.
To be concise, we denote the informed investor who has received signal  by II().
3.3 Incentive compatibility constraints
For II's behavior to be truth-telling, he must prefer to buy whenever he sees a good signal and
short sell whenever he sees a bad signal, or vice versa. Formally, the PM may interpret i = b and
i 6= b (i) as the investor having received signal  and  respectively, or (ii) as the investor having
received signal  and  respectively. Thus, there are two possible sets of incentive compatibility
constraints.
Set 1 (Buy if and only if the signal is ):
Here, the PM interprets i = b as II having received . The IC constraints when short selling
is allowed are:
q()A1() +A1(ne) A0(q(); q())   q()A1() A1(ne) +A0(q(); q()); (IC11)
 q()A1() A1(ne) +A0(q(); q())  q()A1() +A1(ne) A0(q(); q()): (IC12)
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The rst constraint ensures the II prefers to buy when he gets signal ; the second constraint
ensures he prefers to short sell when he gets signal . In other words, the rst constraint deters
II() from mimicking II() with signal , and the second deters II() from mimicking II().
We rearrange IC11 for intuition (the intuition for IC12 is similar):
q()A1()| {z }
(i)
  (q()A1()P () + q()A1()P ())| {z }
(ii)
  q()A1()| {z }
(i)
+(q()A1()P () + q()A1()P ())| {z }
(ii)
On each side of the above inequality, (i) represents the II's expectation of the gain (or loss) in the
asset's value given the signal he is sending, and (ii) is the ex-ante expected gain (or loss) in the
asset's value.
Note that if short-selling is not allowed, the right-hand side will be zero.
Inequalities IC11 and IC12 can also be written as:
A1()
h
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

+ q()(1  2P ()))
i
 0; (IC 011)
A1()
h
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

+ q()(1  2P ()))
i
 0: (IC 012)
Set 2 (Buy if and only if the signal is ):
Here, the PM interprets i = sh as II having received . The incentive compatibility constraints
when short sale is allowed are:
 q()A1() A1(ne) +A0(q(); q())  q()A1() +A1(ne) A0(q(); q()); (IC21)
q()A1() +A1(ne) A0(q(); q())   q()A1() A1(ne) +A0(q(); q()); (IC22)
The rst constraint ensures that II() prefers buying to short selling; the second constraint ensures
that II() prefers short selling to buying. Without short-selling, the left (right) side of the rst
(second) inequality is zero. These constraints can be motivated and simplied as in set 1.
Note that Sets 1 and 2 are precisely the converse of each other, i.e., both constraints are derived
by multiplying both sides by negative one, but holding the inequality signs the same.
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Remark 1: We do not allow the PM to set direct payments after any combination of revealed
signal and realized state. However, A0(q(); q()) plays a role similar to a direct payment in the
standard mechanism model with transferable utility. As shown in the II's payo (e.g., q()(A)+
A1(ne) A0(q(); q())), the choice of randomized policy execution hq(); q()i changes how much
the II has to pay/receive (i.e., A0(q(); q())). To be more specic, if II chooses to buy, his
net payo is q()(A) + A1(ne)  A0(q(); q()), and he has to pay A0(q(); q()). On the other
hand, if an II chooses to short sell, his net payo is  q()(A)   A1(ne) + A0(q(); q()), and
he receives A0(q(); q()) for the short sale. However, the dierence from the direct payment in
the standard mechanism design literature is that A0(q(); q()) depends on the allocation of a
non-money commodity (i.e., the randomized allocation hq(); q()i in our model).
Remarks 2: Our paper can also be compared with the literature on costly signaling models
following Spence (1973): II sends a costly signal by buying/short-selling the asset, and upon
observing II's action, the PM chooses execution/non-execution. The most obvious dierence
between our model and costly signaling models is that the PM commits to the probability of
execution, (q(); q()). However, that is not the only dierence. The strategy q() after observing
signal  also inuences A0(q(); q()), i.e, the equilibrium play determines the payos (including
out-of-equilibrium payos). Thus, our model is not easily comparable, requiring two extensions to
the costly signaling model.
4 Analysis
In this section, we characterize the optimal probabilistic commitment hq(); q()i, which maximizes
the PM's welfare without breaking the incentive compatibility constraints of the IIs.
4.1 General results
With the aforementioned commitment hq(); q()i, the PM's problem is:
max
0q()1
X
s;
P (; s)
h
q()W (e; s) + (1  q())W (ne; s)
i
s:t: IC set 1 (IC11,IC12) or IC set 2 (IC21,IC22). (7)
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We dene the rst best policy, blind policies, and an incentive-constrained optimal policy.
Denition 1 (First best policy) hq() = 1; q() = 0i is the rst best policy.
Denition 2 (Blind policy) hq(); q()i with q() = q() is a blind policy.
Denition 3 (Incentive-constrained optimal policy) An incentive-constrained optimal pol-
icy solves the PM's maximization problem (7).
Considering expression (1), the rst best policy trivially maximizes the policymaker's welfare
since W () > 0 and W () < 0. However, it may not be feasible since it may not be incentive
compatible, as we show later.
A PM who employs a blind policy does not listen to markets as the signal does not alter her
probability of executing the policy, i.e., q() = q(). However, this policy is always incentive
compatible (i.e., it satises one of the two sets of constraints, so that it leads II to take a distinct
action after each signal).
Proposition 4 Any blind policy is incentive compatible (i.e., it satises one of the two sets of
incentive compatibility constraints).
Proof. See Appendix.
With a blind policy, UTs assume it occurs equally often when its eect on the asset is more
favorable and when it is less favorable (or harmful). This is reected in the market price. II will
thus buy if he gets the signal suggesting that execution will be more favorable to the asset's value,
and short sell otherwise. (If, nongenerically, the eect on the asset's value is the same in either state
he is always indierent but his behavior is truth-telling in equilibrium by the standard argument.)
Lemma 5 The incentive-constrained optimal hq(); q()i satises q()  q().
Proof. Considering expression (1) in light of the PM's indierence (Assumption 2), q() < q()
implies that the sum of the last two terms in expression (1) is negative; while q() = q() (i.e., not
listening to markets) implies this sum is zero. Thus we must have q()  q().
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Lemma 5 implies that hearing a truthful signal and then making the wrong policy decision most
of the time is worse than not listening at all.
Proposition 6 The incentive-constrained optimal policy satises 1 = q()  q().
Proof. IC constraints are written as Cq() R q(); as can be seen from a small rearrangement
of (IC 011) and (IC 012) (Note again that Sets 1 and 2 are identical except for the direction of the
inequalities). If the constraint is Cq()  q(), the rst best q() = 1 and q() = 0 trivially
satises the constraint as long as C  0. If C < 0, q() = q() = 0 is the only possible solution.
However, we have shown in the proof for Proposition 4 that for all ~q 2 [0; 1], ~q = q() = q() is
incentive compatible in the relevant constraint set. Thus, Cq()  q() must not be in the relevant
set since only q() = q() = 0 is incentive compatible, while the other ~q = q() = q() is not.
Thus, when an incentive compatibility constraint is binding, it must be expressed as:
Cq()  q():
Since q()  q() from Lemma 5, C  1 must be the case (if not, we have a contradiction:
Cq()  Cq()  q() with C > 1). If C = 1, q() = q() = 1 is a trivial solution since
q()  q().If the constraint is satised with Cq() = q() < 1 where C < 1, then PM could do
better by increasing q() by  and increasing q() by a smaller amount C.
This asymmetric result is consistent with asymmetry of the problem; the PM \naturally" wants
q() = 0 and q() = 1, and zero and one do not have symmetric properties. Note that Proposition
6 holds even when short sale is not allowed (see Remark in Appendix A.3.1). However, this
proposition depends critically on the assumption of endogenous A0; as we demonstrate in section
4.5, if A0 were exogenous, this proposition would not hold.
Given that q() = 1, the only variable we have to deal with is q(). With two constraints
for each set and a single choice variable q(), it is trivial that at most only one constraint binds
generically.
Corollary 7 For a given set, at most one of the two incentive compatibility constraints will bind.
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Note again that (IC11) and (IC12) are identical to (IC22) and (IC21) respectively, except that
the inequalities are reversed. With k 6= i and ` 6= j, if (ICij) holds as an equality with a certain
hq(); q()i, then (ICk`) holds as an equality with hq(); q()i.
We can write down (IC11) and (IC12) as follows:
[q() + q()]A1()| {z }
(a)
 2E(A1)| {z }
(b)
 0  [q() + q()]A1()| {z }
(a)
 2E(A1)| {z }
(b)
; (8)
where E(A1) := A0  A1(ne).
Considering the expression above, we can divide the net payos to II() from the truth-telling
action (relative to an action that falsely sends signal ^) into \policy-driven" and \expectation-
driven" (relative) payos. For set 1, the policy-driven payo, labeled \(a)" above, represents the
change in the asset's value after buying the asset and sending a good signal { i.e., the return for an
\asset owner" { less the negative of the change in the asset's value after short selling and sending
a bad signal { the return for an \asset ower". The expectation-driven payos, labeled \(b)" above,
represent the cost of purchasing the asset less the income from short selling it, i.e., (the negative)
of twice the initial price; these prices are aected by the UT's expectations.
Clearly, the set given by the above two constraints is non-empty only if A1()  A1().
Similarly, Set 2 (i.e., (IC21) and (IC22)) can be expressed as:
[q() + q()]A1()  2E(A1)  0  [q() + q()]A1()  2E(A1) (9)
The set is non-empty only if A1()  A1(). Note that A1()  A1() and A1() 
A1() are exclusive (excepting the knife-edge case) and exhaustive, and that even blind policies
are incentive compatible. Thus,generically, only one set can be implemented, so the relative size
of A1() and A1() fully determines which set of incentive compatibility constraints are used.
From this, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The PM induces Set 1 (\buy only if good") if A1() > A1() and Set 2 (\buy
only if bad") if A1() > A1().
Note that proposition 8 holds even if short-selling is not allowed (in that case, although both sets
may be implementable, only one can be implemented protably; see remarks in appendix A.3.1).
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Finally, we show that the PM always does better by listening to the market.
Proposition 9 The incentive-constrained optimal policy is generically superior to blind policies.
Proof. See appendix A.1.2.
The proof works by showing that generically, for incentive-constrained optimality, q() < 1.
This is then combined with Proposition 6 to show that generically 1 = q() > q(), which is
superior to a blind policy.
In other words, listening is generically better then not listening. Thus { given our assumption
that the signal is informative of the true state { ex-ante indierence implies that the PM is willing
to make commitment hq(); q()i in order to learn the signal. (In some cases, no commitment will
be necessary, i.e., hq() = 1; q() = 0i may be optimal.) Note that proposition 9 will hold whether
or not short selling is allowed (see Remark in Appendix A.3.1).
4.2 Characterizing binding constraints
As we show by characterizing all cases below, for particular values of A1(),A1(), if one IC
constraint binds where P () > 12 > P (), it will not bind where P () <
1
2 < P (): This is shown in
gure 1 below. The (potentially) binding constraint depends here on whether P () > P () or vice
versa. In general, the II may be able to prot from either buying or shorting, i.e., from taking the
action that, in expectation conditional on the signal, and knowing that the PM will follow him, is
more protable. This is because he has an information advantage over the UTs in knowing which
signal he is sending the PM, and thus what the PM will likely do. His informational advantage and
his prot will tend to be greater (from truth-telling) for a given signal the less likely this signal is,
i.e., the lower is P (), as it will induce a less likely policy outcome, hence a larger prot. This oers
intuition for a policymaker: in general she should be more concerned about an informed investor
trying to fake the less likely signal. Figure 1 describes the binding constraints in each region. (Note
that ; means that no constraint is binding, i.e., the PM achieves the rst best).
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A1() = 2P ()A1()
Se
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A1()
A1(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
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(
)
=
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P
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)
A
1
(
)
Se
t 2
Se
t 1
A1()
A1()
P () > 12 > P () P () <
1
2 < P ()
Figure 1: Allowing short-selling
4.3 Full characterization: Six cases
We divide the parameter sets into six cases in terms of the policy's eect on the asset's value after
each signal: (i) A1() > A1() > 0, (ii) A1() > A1() > 0, (iii) A1() > 0 > A1(),
(iv) 0 > A1() > A1(), (v) 0 > A1() > A1(), and (vi) A1() > 0 > A1(). This
classication, along with a taxonomy we will explain, is displayed in gure 2.
(i) Treat
(ii) Tiger(iii) Judo
(iv) Weapon
(v) Chemo (vi) Paternal
Se
t 2
Se
t 1
A1()
A1()
Figure 2: Taxonomy of incentive alignment between PM and an asset-owner
We can interpret these six cases in terms of the alignment of incentives of the PM and the asset
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owner. To give insight, we solve for case 1 in detail; the other ve cases are solved more concisely,
with derivations in the appendix. Results are summarized in gure 3 in section 4.4.
4.3.1 Case (i), \A Treat": A1() > A1() > 0, i.e., the asset's value increases when
the policy is executed, more so with the good signal.
This policy represents a treat for the asset-owner; execution will always increase the asset's value,
but from the PM's perspective, it is only worth \buying this treat" where the signal suggests if
it will be very benecial to the asset holder. This case may reect a trade policy that involves
costly concessions for the government but will be worth executing if it boosts a particular export
sector by a sucient amount; cf. Breinlich (2011). Alternatively, it might reect a public research
and development funding plan that will certainly stimulate some new inventions and raise prots
somewhat, but will require dramatic results to justify its large costs. A macroeconomic stimulus
or a bank or international bailout may have similar properties.21
Proposition 8 implies that Set 1 is relevant, and Proposition 6 implies q() = 1. Since A1() >
0 and A1() > 0, we can rewrite IC
0
11 and IC
0
12 substituting these out:
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  (1  2P ())  0;

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  q()(1  2P ())  0
[Condition 1: P () = 12 = P ()] Then the two constraints become:
q()

1  A1()
A1()

 0;

1  A1()
A1()

 0
Thus we can reduce q() to zero, and the incentive-constrained optimal policy achieves the rst
best, hq() = 1; q() = 0i.
21Extending the model, suppose the II is a large bond speculator, the PM is the European Union, and the policy
is a package guaranteeing bonds against default, requiring austerity measures, and giving loans and aid to Greece.
The default risk and the eectiveness of the policy are both uncertain. The bond holders (and Greek leaders) might
prefer the EU to provide the maximal aid, but it may not be worth the cost to the EU. The EU could \announce
consideration" of a policy, implying a certain conditional probability of execution, and see how the markets react.
The direction of the likely eect is known (bonds will increase in value and yields will decline) but the magnitude of
the eect will determine whether to execute the policy.
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[Condition 2: P () > 12 > P ()] Suppose P () >
1
2 > P (). Then the above is simplied into:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)
 1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(b)
 q()
Note that the second inequality is reversed as it was divided by a negative number.
Both (a) and (b) are larger than 1. Since the PM wants to decrease q() as much as she can,
the only relevant (i.e., binding) constraint is the rst one. Thus we conclude:
For P () > 1=2 > P ();
D
q() = 1; q() =
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
E
:
[Condition 3: P () < 12 < P ()] Then the ICs are simplied into:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()  1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()  q()
The rst constraint is irrelevant irrespective of the sign of
1 2P ()A1()
A1()
1 2P () as the PM wants to
minimize q() (note that q() = 0 trivially satises the rst constraint). If
1 2P ()A1()
A1()
1 2P () is negative,
then the second constraint is also irrelevant; the optimal solution is hq() = 1; q() = 0i. If
1 2P ()A1()
A1()
1 2P () is positive, it is smaller than 1. Then the second constraint is relevant, i.e., the
second constraint binds, and we derive the optimal solution
D
q() = 1; q() =
1 2P ()A1()
A1()
1 2P ()
E
.
To summarize, the optimal policy interprets the II's buying as signal  and his not buying as
signal . The optimal incentive-constrained optimal policy is:
For P () < 1=2 < P ();
D
q() = 1; q() = max

0;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()
E
;
for P () > 1=2 > P ();
D
q() = 1; q() =
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
E
;
and for P () = 1=2 = P (); hq() = 1; q() = 0i; i.e., the rst best.
Note that P () = 1=2 = P () implies the rst best, hq() = 1; q() = 0i for all cases, so we will
not mention it further.
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Remark 3 [Binding constraints and signal probabilities]: Consider why the second con-
straint (IC12) does not bind where P () > P (). Suppose these probabilities, and suppose the
policy is at the rst-best hq() = 1; q() = 0i. Here, an II() type will want to short sell and
deter execution. The UTs believe that the policy is executed \most of the time"; thus deterring
execution yields the larger information advantage or \surprise". II() can prot from this infor-
mation advantage in proportion to A1(), as when he short-sells the UTs compensate him for
their predicted execution after the good signal.
In contrast, if II() were to buy and induce execution, this would bring only the smaller
A1() in ex-post prot while to buy the asset he would have to compensate the UTs for their
expectation of asset gains from execution under the good signal, paying them P ()A1().
Now consider why (IC12) may bind where P () < P (). Here if the policy were rst-best the
UTs would believe it would be executed less then half of the time; thus inducing execution yields
the larger surprise, an information advantage of 1   P (). On the other hand, the (ex-post) gain
from inducing execution here is only proportional to A1() but he must pay the UT's for the asset
in proportion to A1(); the \asymmetric asset gain" hurts him here. In contrast, by short-selling
and deterring execution he is inducing a smaller surprise but will not have to pay for the asymmetric
asset gain. These two eects go in the opposite direction, and where the \larger surprise" advantage
outweighs the \asymmetric asset gain" cost { i.e., where i.e., where 2P () < A1()A1() { then IC12
will bind.
Note that derivations for cases 2-6 are in appendix A.2.
4.3.2 Case (ii), \Tiger": A1() > A1() > 0, i.e., the asset's value increases when
the policy is executed, less so with the good signal.
Consider a benet program such as the USA's Medicare part D that is expected to be somewhat
protable for the drug industry, but will also yield other public benets. However, depending on
the true market structure and true prospects for innovation, the drug industry might be able to
use this to reap excess prots at the expense of consumers (see Friedman, 2009).
Solution: The PM will use Set 1, i.e., will induce the II to short sell under the good signal, and
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buy under the bad signal. She will do this by setting:D
q() = 1; q() =
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
E
if P () < 1=2 < P ();
and setting
D
q() = 1; q() = max

0;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()
E
if P () > 1=2 > P ().
The contrast between cases (i) and (ii) oers real-world lessons. The choice of which type of
behavior to try to induce depends on the relative gains to the asset under the good or bad policy.
If the asset does better when the policy is bad, policymakers may want to get informed investors
to buy only if the policy is bad, and then will have to promise to execute the policy with some
probability anyway.
4.3.3 Case (iii), \Judo": A1() > 0 > A1(), i.e., the asset's value increases when
policy is executed under the bad signal, and decreases when it is executed under
the good signal.
For this case the dimension of interaction between the policymaker and the industry is largely
zero-sum, with few mutual gains or losses. The policy may be a reform of taxes or regulation
that intends to be harsher and more punitive. However, it may backre, perhaps if the rm nds
loopholes, and may actually increase prots (hence the term \Judo").
Solution: The PM will use Set 2 and induce the II to short sell under the good signal, and buy
under the bad signal, by setting:
For P () < 1=2 < P (); hq() = 1; q() = 0i:
For P () > 1=2 > P ();
D
q() = 1; q() =
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
E
:
4.3.4 Case (iv), \Weapon": 0 > A1() > A1(), i.e., the asset's value decreases
when the policy is executed, more so with the good signal.
This describes a policy intended (or expected) to severely reduce prots. Perhaps these prots are
seen as monopoly or monopsony rents, and thus reducing them may increase consumer surplus.
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There may be some cost to administering this policy. It may require a severe regulatory burden so
it will only be worth doing if it has a major \trust busting" eect. Advocates of this policy may
argue that it will reduce \excess proteering" by monopolists and oligopolists. Opponents may
argue it will have little eect on rents, as the oligopolists will nd ways to evade it, yet it will lead
to large bureaucratic costs and negative unintended consequences for consumers. This policy is a
\weapon" worth using only if it is erce enough.
Solution: The PM will use Set 2 and induce the II to short sell under the good signal and buy
under the bad signal, by setting:
For P () > 1=2 > P ();
D
q() = 1; q() =
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
E
;
and for P () < 1=2 < P ();
D
q() = 1; q() = max

0;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()
E
4.3.5 Case (v), \Chemotherapy": 0 > A1() > A1(), i.e., The asset's value de-
creases when the policy is executed, more so with the bad signal.
This may reect a tax increase or increase in the regulatory burden on industry, but one that is
not intended to be excessively burdensome. The Polish mining tax (see section 2.1) oers a good
example. This also may reect a stricter price cap for a regulated industry such as a utility; the
government wants to limit prots but not to bankrupt the rm(s). Macroeconomic policy raising
interest rates to respond to ination might be similarly characterized. Like chemotherapy, this
policy is expected to do some damage, but it is only successful if it does not harm the patient (or
asset) too much.
Solution: The PM will use Set 1 and induce the II to buy under the good signal and short sell
under the bad signal, by setting:
For P () > 1=2 > P ();
D
q() = 1; q() = max

0;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()
E
; and
for P () < 1=2 < P ();
D
q() = 1; q() =
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
E
:
26
4.3.6 Case (vi), \Paternalist": A1() > 0 > A1(), i.e., The asset's value increases
when policy is executed under a good signal, and decreases when it is executed
after a bad signal.
This reects a policy that under some circumstances will have direct or indirect benets for the
industry, and in other cases will hurt the industry. It may be directly designed to benet the indus-
try, such as a change in regulations meant to deter destructive competition, or allow coordination
on an industry-standard. This may apply to patent reform, or to a complicated change in trade
agreements or in immigration law. Another policy that is contested in this way is putting limits
on CEO pay. This may also reect policy with other goals, e.g., an educational reform, but which
is only seen as worth doing if it happens to help (and not harm) some key industries. This might
be called a paternalist policy because at best it helps an industry achieve higher prots than they
could achieve alone, but at worst it represents a misguided government overreach that hurts the
private sector.
Solution: The PM will induce the II to buy under the good signal and short sell under the bad
signal, by setting:
For P () > 1=2 > P ();
D
q() = 1; q() =
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
E
:
For P () < 1=2 < P (); hq() = 1; q() = 0i:
Remark 4: Note that the rst best is achieved if the good signal is more likely. This agrees with
our standard notion of \aligned incentives": both the government and an asset holder will want
the policy executed if and only if it is a good policy. If the asset price A0 were unaected by the
q functions, this would hold for any value of P (). With an exogenous A0 the II would only care
about the impact of the policy on the asset's fundamental value, and incentives would be clearly
aligned. He would always want to buy after a good signal, inducing the \good" policy and making
a prot on the asset, and would never want to buy after a bad signal. With the endogenous A0
this is still the case if the good signal is more rare, and thus the information advantage can also
be better exploited from inducing execution than from short selling and inducing non-execution.
However, if the good signal is the more common one, the \natural" incentives to increase the asset's
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value and the greater information advantage go in opposite directions, thus q() may need to be
increased to get truthful behavior. A similar insight holds for the symmetric case (iii), i.e., wherever
the expected direction of the policy impact on the asset depends on the signal. This highlights an
insight for policymaker: even if ex-post incentives are aligned, the incentive to buy or short sell an
asset may not be.
4.4 Comparison with an alternative model without short sale
We now summarize the optimal policies for all of the cases graphically. Since q() = 1 whether
short sale is allowed or not, we omit the value of q() in graphs. We rst present the algebraic
solutions by region and probabilities P () R P (); we also illustrate the incentive-constrained
optimal policy when short sale is not available to informed investors. The derivation is in appendix
A.3.
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Figure 3: Allowing short-selling
Simple intuition might suggest that restricting the tools available to the informed investor, e.g.,
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Figure 4: Without short-selling
by forbidding short sale, would make it harder for him to `manipulate' the policy outcome and
conversely, easier to get him to reveal his private information. However, as seen in Figure 3 and
4, sometimes allowing II to short sell lowers the incentive compatible q() and thus improves the
PM's welfare. There are two potentially countervailing eects. First, the potentially protable
short-selling opportunity means II may not prefer to buy after a good signal. Second, allowing
short-selling may make it easier to dissuade him from buying after a bad signal.
Indeed, it can be easily shown that with P () < P (), allowing short sale (weakly) lowers q()
in cases (ii)-(vi). Even in region (i), allowing short sale increases welfare if A1()  P ()A1()
or 12  P ()  13 holds when P () < P (). Even when P () > P () is the case, we can
nd some necessary and sucient conditions under which allowing short sale improves welfare:
A1() >
1
2A1() and A1() > P ()A1() in region (i), A1() < 2P ()A1() in region
(ii), 12 > P () >
1
3 in regions (iii) and (iv), no condition is required in region (v), and q() = 0 in
region (vi) with or without the possibility of short sale. These comparisons are shown in gures 3
and 4. We give comparisons for (P () = 3=4; P () = 1=4) and (P () = 1=4; P () = 3=4) in gures
5 and 6
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Although allowing short sale provides a further tool for II's deviation, it also can provides II
more benet when he is truthful. Short sale makes both the right-hand side and the left hand side
of each incentive compatibility constraint larger; hence, it may become easier (or harder) to enforce
truth-telling.
P () = 34 > P () =
1
4 P () =
1
4 < P () =
3
4
Figure 5: With short-selling
P () = 34 > P () =
1
4 P () =
1
4 < P () =
3
4
Figure 6: Without short-selling
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4.5 Comparison with an alternative model with exogenous A0 and without short
sale
Our above proposition 6 { stating that the PM may set q() > 0 but will always set q() = 1 {
depended on the endogeneity of A0 in (q(); q()). To illustrate this point, we show that when A0
is exogenous, q() = 0 and q() < 1 is optimal for certain values of the parameters.
We consider one such case as an example. The full case-by-case analysis is available by request.
We henceforth use the following notation:
EV (pj) =
X
P (sj)V (p; s; i = b):
We consider a case that resembles case (i) of our preferred model. We assume that an II who
buys gets a prot when a good policy is executed, a lower prot when a bad policy is executed,
and sustains a loss when the policy is not executed. (It is trivial to show that these payos could
arise from a particular assumption over the xed initial asset price A0 and the assets' value under
each state and policy outcome.) We assume that the investor's payo satises the following.
EV (ej) > EV (ej) > 0 > EV (nej) (10)
Condition (10) implies that the rst set of IC constraints is relevant. Here II() is induced to
choose i = b, while II() must choose i = nb. In other words, sending the bad signal means not
buying the asset. This requires the following incentive compatibility constraints:
X
s
P (sj)[q()(V (e; s; b)) + (1  q())V (ne; s; b)]  0; (11)
0 
X
s
P (sj)[q()V (e; s; b) + (1  q())V (ne; s; b)]: (12)
When II() deviates to not buy, he earns nothing; as does II() when he tells the truth by not
buying (i = nb); hence the zero terms on the right (left) side of the rst (second) inequality. A
similar interpretation applies to the second incentive compatibility constraint.
Set 1 is further simplied into:
q()[EV (ej)  EV (nej)]   EV (nej) and   EV (nej)  q()[EV (ej)  EV (nej)]: (13)
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If the agent does not buy the asset, he no longer cares whether the policy is executed or not.
Hence, the PM will set q() = 0, as executing the policy after a bad signal will be costly but does
not encourage truth-telling. In other words, under Condition 10, q() = 0; as we show formally
below. (Note that the same intuition does not go through in our preferred model with endogenous
A0; setting q() > 0 in our preferred model will aect the asset's initial price and thus the II's
relative incentives to buy or short.)
The objective function is:
X
s;
P (; s)W (ne; s) + q()P () (EW (ej)  EW (nej))| {z }
(+)
+q()P () (EW (ej)  EW (nej))| {z }
( )
:
As q() is not present in the constraints, the PM must set q() = 0, as W () < 0 from the
previously dened welfare function.
On the other hand q() cannot be either 0 or 1: if q() = 1, then the investor with signal  = 
always succeeds in deceiving the policymaker, and if q() = 0, then the policymaker never executes
the policy, which implies an ineciency since the policymaker ignores valuable information. Thus
q() must be a number between 0 and 1.
We derive the optimal value of q() in appendix A.4. This yields the optimal policy
D
q() =
0; q() = 1EV (ej)
  EV (nej)+1
E
under Condition 10, that is, q() < 1. The PM interprets the II's buying
(not buying) as having received signal  (signal ).
This demonstrates that (as noted above) with a xed initial asset price A0 and no short selling,
the PM optimally sets hq() < 1, q() = 0i for some ranges of parameters.
5 Conclusion
Although politicians often appear to be more concerned with immediate public opinion than with
the ecacy of policies, in cases where voters do not have a strong issue identication, performance
is what matters.22 Thus, after oating policy \trial balloons" politicians may listen to both polls
22This is likely to hold for technical \hard issues" (Carmines and Stimson, 1980). Fiorina (1978), among others
found some evidence for \retrospective voting"; however, there is debate over its explanatory power (see e.g., Fiorina
et al., 2003).
32
and markets.23
The ability to listen and conditionally commit, perhaps imprecisely, may be embodied in the
political system. In a system with several branches of government, the framers of a constitution
could either allow an executive (President or Premier) to execute policy unilaterally, or require her
to put a bill to the legislative branch (or directly to the people). Although she cannot precisely
set the probability it will be passed after each type of market news she can make the bill more
or less palatable the rst time she submits it. For example, President Obama could have rst
submitted his health care bill with public funding of abortion, which presumably would have made
it unlikely to pass. If it failed, but the market's reaction appeared favorable, he could then submit
a similar bill without the abortion provision. The constitutional and procedural \rules" may aect
the extent to which a bill's sponsor can introduce unrelated \riders," the extent to which the bill
can be adjusted throughout the process, and the length of time a bill is considered.
The commitment might also take the form of a policy trial, perhaps one with a high probability
of a type-I or type-II error. The PM could commit to follow the results of the trial if they are
strongly signicant in one direction or the other, which may be a small fraction of the time. Here,
the PM might not actually expect to learn from the trial; instead she cares more about how the
market reacts to the announcement of the trial. Where the trial's results are not signicant, she
can follow the signals generated by II's behavior.
Another commitment strategy is committing political capital. A government, political party,
or faction may come out in support of a policy, and put their credibility on the line. This may
make it costly but not impossible to later vote against the policy if the market reveals a negative
signal.24 This commitment would plausibly have no eect on the probability of execution if the
market reveals a good signal. This commitment may be made weaker or stronger depending on
the number of legislators that are asked to speak strongly in favor of the policy. Suppose there is
23Listening to the market is not equivalent to a referendum; the commitments we describe allow the PM to use
the market to extract private information about the potential results of policies. Unlike referendum voters, traders
in the market are \voting" about what they think is protable, but not necessarily voting for what benets them as
a private citizen.
24This cost could come from a loss of reputation for managerial expertise as in Prendergast and Stole (1996) or a
simple voter dislike or distrust of inconsistency and \ip-opping", perhaps signalling untrustworthiness
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asymmetric information over these legislators' true preferences or allow other sources of randomness
such as revealed public support. A simple model should demonstrate that the likelihood that the
bill is passed after a bad signal would increase in the number of legislators committing political
capital to the policy.
Generally, a long deliberation permitting amendments and reconsiderations may allow legisla-
tors more time and exibility to listen to the market; \fast-tracking" will limit this. The timeline
under which a policy is introduced to the legislative process could also aect its conditional prob-
ability of execution after each signal. Suppose the market is expected to reveal its signal(s) about
the policy with a known hazard rate. The bill could then be scheduled for a vote on a particular
date, implying a certain probability that the (good or bad) signal will have been revealed.
Adding legislator-specic favors and \pork", or unfavorable \poison" to the bill could also alter
the conditional probabilities. Suppose that there is uncertainty about legislator's preferences and
thus uncertainty over the probability that a bill will pass after either signal (or without a signal).
However, some legislators' preferences can be identied: known \swing Democrats" will always
support the bill after a good signal, but may oppose it after a bad signal. Suppose that oering
pork for a legislator's district will raise the probability that she votes for a bill after any signal {
this is, of course, as long as she is not already certain to vote for (against) the bill. Oering pork
for a swing Democrat will increase q() without aecting q().
As noted, our indirect mechanism does not follow the standard rules. There are reasons why
it may not be feasible to set up an explicit mechanism, paying investors for insider information.
Such \strange handouts" would likely be politically unpopular. It may be dicult to know which
investors have the \accurate" information. The government could try to commit such investors who
claim to have information to put money down and take losses if they are wrong, however they may
not be able to pay back such losses, and they may be reluctant, or perhaps unable (because of credit
constraints) to put money down in advance. The asset markets that exist are already suited to deal
with these commitment problems. Secondly, if the government recruited and oered commitments
to these \informants" it would still have to carefully monitor what positions the informants take in
assets market. They may have outside investments that would undermine the mechanism for truth
telling in the explicit \direct payments" mechanism. Therefore, the asset markets will still need
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to be taken into account. Finally, to the extent that the government could design mechanisms of
rewards and punishments on its own, the considerations that will be relevant will be similar to the
ones we describe below.
It is possible that for more technical policies and for more technocratic policymakers this will
involve explicit randomization. However, we think it will more likely to take the form (and may
have already taken the form) of introducing bills and legislation that has diering likelihood of
passing, and exploiting the randomness in the political system. We also imagine that, even if
policymakers do not explicitly consider the extent to which they should introduce randomness, we
oer a framework for thinking about how they can use the market signals to adapt policy. As noted
above, we have suggestive evidence that they are already taking into account how the market reacts
in formulating legislation and in executing it.
One concern mentioned by Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) is that if there are several public and
private signals of a policy's ecacy, the interpretation of the dierence in the conditional asset's
value will depend on all of these, and may be dicult to interpret. E.g., a government may only
execute a carbon cap in the event of severe ooding of the Eastern seaboard; hence the conditional
expectation of GDP in the event of a carbon cap may also reect the expectation of the eect this
ooding. Thus, introducing exogenous randomness may have an additional benet: it may help
improve the interpretation of market signals even without manipulation. Our own modeling does
not address this, as we focus on the investor's private signal; this is scope for future work.
Our model could be extended in several ways. Future work might examine a case where the
policymaker is seeking to inuence investor behavior. It may also be interesting to model an
investor who has an inherent interest, e.g., owning a asset aected by the policy which cannot be
sold without costs.
The most valuable extensions will be empirical. Economists should seek to identify and measure
the ways in which particular asset values will be dierentially aected by policies, and how this
relates to the policies' welfare consequences. Where a connection is found, economists should also
measure the extent to which the information is concentrated in the hands of potential \manipula-
tors." Armed with this information, policymakers may benet by setting up a \listening process",
bearing in mind the implementation concerns we describe. As we describe, they may need to limit
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the extent to which good or bad news feeds directly into policy, incorporating literal or approximate
ex-ante policy commitments.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs for Lemmas and Propositions
A.1.1 Proof for Proposition 4
It is trivial that q() = q() = 0 is incentive compatible.
Now consider q() = q() > 0. Plugging ~q = q() = q() > 0 into (IC 011) and (IC 012), we derive:
~q
h
A1()  2P ()A1() +A1()  2P ()A1()
i
 0 , 2~qP ()
h
A1() A1()
i
 0;
~q
h
A1()  2P ()A1() +A1()  2P ()A1()
i
 0 , 2~qP ()
h
A1() A1()
i
 0
using P () + P () = 1.
Similarly, plugging ~q = q() = q() > 0 into (IC21) and (IC22), we derive:
2~qP ()
h
A1() A1()
i
 0; 2~qP ()
h
A1() A1()
i
 0:
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As noted earlier, the two sets are identical except the direction of the inequalities. Set 1 is satised
if A1()  A1(), and Set 2 is satised if A1()  A1(). Thus a blind policy is incentive
compatible in terms of one set of incentive compatibility constraints.
A.1.2 Proof for Proposition 9
To prove this we show that generically, for incentive-constrained optimality, q() < 1. From
Proposition 6, this implies generically 1 = q() > q(), which is superior to a blind policy.
Generically, A1() 6= A1(). (i) Assume A1() > A1(). Suppose that q() = q() = 1
non-generically. Then Set 1 becomes: 2P ()
h
A1()  A1()
i
 0; 2P ()
h
A1()  A1()
i
 0
as shown in the proof for Proposition 4. We can see that both of these two constraints hold with
strict inequality, implying q() < 1 would also satisfy these constraints, and thus q() = 1 must
be suboptimal. (ii) Assuming A1() < A1(), we can apply the same logic to the second set of
incentive compatibility constraints to derive a contradiction.
A.2 Derivations for cases 2-6
A.2.1 Case ii: A1() > A1() > 0
Proposition 8 implies that Set 2 is the relevant one. Also q() = 1 from Proposition 6. Since
A1() > A1() > 0, we can simplify the two incentive constraints into:
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  (1  2P ())  0;

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  q()(1  2P ())  0
[Case 1: P () > 12 > P ()] Then the above is simplied into:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()  1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(b)
 q()
Clearly, the rst constraint is not relevant as the PM wants to minimize q(). If (b) > 0, then
the solution is < q() = 1; q() =
1 2P ()A1()
A1()
1 2P () >. If (b)  0, then the second constraint is also
irrelevant by the same reason; thus the solution is < q() = 1; q() = 0 >. In summary, the
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solution is:
For P () > 1=2 > P ();
D
q() = 1; q() = max

0;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()
E
[Case 2: P () < 12 < P ()]. The incentive compatibility constraints are:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)
 1; 1  1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()| {z }
(b)
q()
Then the second constraint is irrelevant as PM wants to minimize q(). Note (a) > 1, so the
solution is:
For P () < 1=2 < P ();
D
q() = 1; q() =
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
E
:
A.2.2 Case iii: A1() > 0 > A1()
Proposition 8 implies that Set 2 is the relevant one. Also q() = 1 from Proposition 6. Since
A1() > 0 > A1(), we can simplify these into:
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  (1  2P ())  0;

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  q()(1  2P ())  0
[Case 1: P () > 12 > P ()] The above is simplied into:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)
 1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(b)
 q()
Note that (a) > 1 and (b) < 0; thus, the second constraint is irrelevant, and the result follows.
For P () > 1=2 > P ();
D
q() = 1; q() =
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
E
:
[Case 2: P () < 12 < P ()] The incentive compatibility constraints are:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)<0
 1; 1  1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()| {z }
(b)>0
q()
Note that since (a) < 0 and (b) > 0 hold, both of the constraints are irrelevant, so the solution is:
For P () < 1=2 < P (); hq() = 1; q() = 0i:
39
A.2.3 Case iv: 0 > A1() > A1()
Proposition 8 implies that Set 2 is the relevant one. Also q() = 1 from Proposition 6. Since
0 > A1() > A1(), the constraints are simplied into:
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  (1  2P ())  0;

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  q()(1  2P ())  0
[Case 1: P () > 12 > P ()] The above can be simplied into:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)
 1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(b)
 q()
Note that (a) > 1 and (b) > 1; thus, the second constraint is irrelevant, and the result follows.
[Case 2: P () < 12 < P ()] then the IC constraints can be written as:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)<1
 1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(b)<1
 q()
Since (a) < 1, the rst constraint is irrelevant. If (b) < 0, the second constraint is also irrelevant;
and the optimal solution is < q() = 1; q() = 0 >. If 0 < (b) < 1, then the optimal solution is
< q() = 1; q() =
1 2P ()A1()
A1()
1 2P () >. So the result follows.
A.2.4 Case v: 0 > A1() > A1()
Proposition 8 implies that Set 1 is the relevant one. Also q() = 1 from Proposition 6.
Set 1 is:
A1()
h
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  q()(1  2P ()))
i
 0;
A1()
h
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  q()(1  2P ()))
i
 0:
Since 0 > A1() > A1(), we can simplify the above into:
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  (1  2P ())  0;

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  q()(1  2P ())  0
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[Case 1: P () > 12 > P ()] Then the above is simplied into:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)
 1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(b)
 q()
Clearly the rst constraint is irrelevant as the PM wants to minimize q().
If (b) 2 (0; 1), then the optimal solution is < q() = 1; q() = 1 2P ()
A1()
A1()
1 2P () >. If (b) < 0, then
the second constraint is also irrelevant; thus, the optimal solution is < q() = 1; q() = 0 >. In
summary, the optimal solution is:
For P () > 1=2 > P ();
D
q() = 1; q() = max

0;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()
E
:
[Case 2: P () < 12 < P ()] The incentive compatibility constraints are:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)>1
 1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(b)>1
 q()
Note that (a) > 1 and (b) > 1. Thus, the second constraint is irrelevant, and the result follows.
A.2.5 Case vi: A1() > 0 > A1()
Proposition 8 implies that Set 1 is the relevant one. Also q() = 1 from Proposition 6. Since
A1() > 0 > A1(), we can simplify these into:
q()

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  (1  2P ())  0;

1  2P ()A1()
A1()

  q()(1  2P ())  0
[Case 1: P () > 12 > P ()] Then the above is simplied into:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)
 1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(b)
 q()
Note that (a) > 1 and (b) < 0, so that the second constraint is irrelevant, and the result follows
from the rst constraint.
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[Case 2: P () < 12 < P ()] The incentive compatibility constraints are:
q()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(a)<0
 1;
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P ()| {z }
(b)>1
 q()
Note that (a) < 0 and (b) > 1. Thus, the rst constraint is irrelevant, and the result follows.
A.3 Model without short selling
A.3.1 Incentive compatibility constraints
The 1st set: Buy if and only if the signal is .
Making the right-hand side of (IC 011) and the left-hand side of (IC 012) zero, the two incentive
compatibility constraints without the possibility of short sale become:
q()A1()  q()A1() (14)
P ()q()A1()  (q()  P ()q())A1() (15)
The 2nd set: Buy if and only if the signal is 
Similar to the 1st set, we derive Set 2 without the possibility of short sale:
q()A1()  q()A1() (16)
P ()q()A1()  (q()  P ()q())A1() (17)
Remark: Note that plugging ~q := q() = q() into the four constraints, we can prove Proposition
4 the same way. Also all four constraints are of form Cq() R q(); thus, the proof for Proposition
6 can be done the same way in the current environment too. Plugging ~q := q() = q() into the
four constraints makes it possible to show Proposition 9 the same way too. Finally, inequalities (9)
are written as follows in the current environment:
q()A1()  E(A1)  0  q()A1()  E(A1)
Thus, the non-emptiness of the above set implies A1()  A1(). Thus, Proposition 8 can be
proven the same way in the current environment.
In summary, the incentive-constrained optimal policy satises 1 = q()  q(), and Set 1 (Set
2) is the relevant one if and only if A1()  A1() (A1()  A1()).
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A.3.2 Further simplication of the two sets of incentive compatibility constraints
With q() = 1, we can rewrite the second constraint of Set 1 as:
P ()A1()  A1()  q()P ()A1()
, q()P ()A1()  (A1()  P ()A1()) = (A1()  (1  P ())A1())
q()A1() 
A1() A1()
P ()
+ A1()

Thus Set 1 is combined into:
A1()  A1()q() 
hA1() A1()
P ()
+ A1()
i
; (18)
and Set 2 is similarly combined into
A1()q()  A1() 
hA1() A1()
P ()
+ A1()
i
q(): (19)
A.3.3 A1() > A1() > 0
We consider Set 1, inequalities (18).
A1()  A1()q() 
hA1() A1()
P ()
+ A1()
i
;
Since the policymaker wants to minimize q(), the only constraint that might bind is the second
one. Note that the bracket term could be positive or negative depending on the sign of A1() 
P ()A1() since
A1() A1()
P () +A1() =
1
P ()(A1()  (1 P ())A1()) = 1P ()(A1() 
P ()A1()).
If 1P ()(A1()   P ()A1()) < 1, the constraint does not bind, and the optimal solution is
< q() = 1; q() = 0 >.
On the other hand if 1P ()(A1()   P ()A1()) > 1, the constraint is binding; thus, the
optimal solution is
D
q() = 1; q() = 1P ()

1  P ()A1()A1()
E
.
In summary, the optimal policy isD
q() = 1; q() = max

0;
1
P ()

1  P ()A1()
A1()
E
:
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A.3.4 A1() > A1() > 0
We consider Set 2:
A1()q()  A1() 
hA1() A1()
P ()
+ A1()
i
q():
Since the policymaker wants to minimize q(), the only the rst constraint binds. Thus, the solution
is: D
q() = 1; q() =
A1()
A1()
E
:
A.3.5 A1() > 0 > A1()
We consider Set 2:
A1()q()  A1() 
hA1() A1()
P ()
+ A1()
i
q():
The only constraint that might bind is the second one, which is re-written as 1 
h1 A1()
A1()
P () +
A1()
A1()
i
q(). Note that the bracket term is simplied as 1P ()
h
1   A1()A1() + P ()
A1()
A1()
i
=
1 P ()A1()
A1()
P () , which is larger than 1 since P () < 1 and 1   P ()A1()A1() > 1. Thus, the solu-
tion is: D
q() = 1; q() =
P ()
1  P ()A1()A1()
E
:
A.3.6 0 > A1() > A1()
We consider Set 2:
[ A1()]q()  [ A1()] 
h A1() + A1()
P ()
 A1()
i
q():
Since the policymaker wants to minimize q(), the second inequality binds, which is re-written as:
1 
h1  A1()A1()
P ()
+
A1()
A1()
i
q():
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Note that the bracket term is simplied as 1P ()
h
1  A1()A1() + P ()
A1()
A1()
i
=
1 P ()A1()
A1()
P () , which
is larger than 1 since

1  P ()A1()A1()

> 1  P () = P (). Thus solution is:
D
q() = 1; q() =
P ()
1  P ()A1()A1()
E
:
A.3.7 0 > A1() > A1()
We consider Set 1:
[ A1()]  [ A1()]q() 
h A1() + A1()
P ()
 A1()
i
| {z }
(+)
:
Since the policymaker wants to minimize q(), the rst inequality binds. Thus, the solution is:D
q() = 1; q() =
  A()
 A1()
E
:
A.3.8 A1() > 0 > A1()
We consider Set 1:
A1()  A1()q() 
hA1() A1()
P ()
+ A1()
i
:
To minimize q(), the only constraint that might bind is the second constraint.
Dividing both sides by A1(), we derive q() 
h1 A1()
A1()
P () +
A1()
A1()
i
since A1() is negative.
Then q() = 0 satises the constraint. Thus, the solution is:
< q() = 1; q() = 0 > :
A.4 Derivation for case of xed A0, no short-selling, condition (10)
The rst set of incentive compatibility constraints (13) is equivalent to the following under condition
(10):
q()   EV (nej)
EV (ej)  EV (nej) and q() 
 EV (nej)
EV (ej)  EV (nej) :
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Moreover we get the following with condition (10):
 EV (nej)
EV (ej)  EV (nej) <
 EV (nej)
EV (ej)  EV (nej) :
Thus, the two constraints become
 EV (nej)
EV (ej)  EV (nej)  q() 
 EV (nej)
EV (ej)  EV (nej) :
The policy maker wants to increase q() as long as the two incentive compatibility constraints
are satised. Thus, we conclude:
q() =
 EV (nej)
EV (ej)  EV (nej) =
1
EV (ej)
 EV (nej) + 1
:
Note that this value is between 0 and 1 under condition 10.
A.5 Short selling or buying is superior to not buying
Consider the case of A1() > A1(). II()'s payo when he buys and II()'s payo when he
short sells are, respectively:
q()A1()  (P ()q()A() + P ()q()A()) = P ()[q()A1()  q()A1()], and
 q()A1() + (P ()q()A() + P ()q()A()) = P ()[q()A1()  q()A1()]
As shown in Lemma 5, q()  q() must be the case. (Note that the proof for Lemma 5 depends
only on the PM's welfare function.)
For case (i) in which A1() > A1() > 0, both of the above payos are positive since
q()  q(). The same holds for case (vi) in which A1() > 0 > A1(). For case (v) in which
0 > A1() > A1(), suppose P () > P (). Plugging the optimal q() and q() = 1 into
q()A1()  q()A1(), we derive:
A1() 
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P () A1() =
A1() A1()
1  2P () > 0:
On the other hand, suppose P () < P (). Plugging the optimal q() and q() = 1 into q()A1() 
q()A1(), we derive:
A1()  1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
A1() =
A1() A1()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
> 0:
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Thus, we have shown that the two payos are non-negative when A1() > A1().
Similarly, consider the case of A1() < A1(). II()'s payo when he short sells and
II()'s payo when he buys are, respectively:
 q()A1() + (P ()q()A() + P ()q()A()) = P ()[q()A1()  q()A1()], and
q()A1()  (P ()q()A() + P ()q()A()) = P ()[q()A1()  q()A1()]
For case (ii) in which A1() > A1() > 0, suppose P () > P (). Plugging the optimal q()
and q() = 1 into [q()A1()  q()A1()], we derive
1  2P ()A1()A1()
1  2P () A1() A1() =
A1() A1()
1  2P () > 0:
On the other hand, suppose P () < P (). Plugging the optimal q() and q() = 1 into [q()A1() 
q()A1()], we derive
1  2P ()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
A1() A1() = A1() A1()
1  2P ()A1()A1()
> 0:
For case (iii) in which A1() > 0 > A1(), the two payos are trivially non-negative. The same
holds for case (iv) in which 0 > A1() > A1().
Thus we have shown that the payos are also non-negative when A1() < A1().
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